The second plenary session of the ERF 17th Annual Conference provided participants with three different but equally interesting perspectives addressing the question: Do Institutional Constraints on Policy-makers Work? The session was moderated by Caroline Freund, World Bank Chief Economist for the Middle East and North Africa.
Given the political regime, does it matter whether a country adopts institutional reforms that put constraints on policymakers, for example, to promote central bank independence,fiscal balance, effective stabilization funds, capital account stability or decentralization ofdecision-making? Under which conditions are these rules effective and credible? The session focused on assessing the experience of different countries, highlighting the features andunderlying conditions that make these rules successful.
Ibrahim Elbadawi from the Dubai Economic Policy and Research Institute kicked off the day with a presentation on fiscal rules, political checks and balances and democracy: why are fiscal rules important? when do government tend to adopt fiscal regime? is there a direct correlation between democracy index and checks&balances in determining fiscal policies?
From his side, Gary Milante from the World Bank offered insights in the upcoming World Development Report 2011- Conflict, Security and Development. This year edition of the Bank flagship publication aims to “showcase new thinking and contribute concrete, practical suggestions to the debate on how to address violent conflict and fragility.”
Last but not least, Lant Pritchett from Harward University draw the audience attention on the concept and role of institutions, and the difference between the de jure and de facto institutional structures – read related post here.
- Do Institutional Constraints on Policymakers work?
- The 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development
- Building New Democracies: Norms Shape Practice